nationalsecuritylaw United States v. Bujol (S.D. Tex.)

November 15, 2011

From the DOJ press release:

HOUSTON — Barry Walter Bujol Jr., a 30-year-old Hempstead, Texas, resident and former student at Prairie View A&M University, has been convicted for attempting to provide material support to Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), a designated foreign terrorist organization, Kenneth Magidson, U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Texas, announced today, along with Lisa Monaco, Assistant Attorney General for National Security. The verdict was returned today in Houston federal court by U.S. District Judge David Hittner.

Bujol requested a bench trial before Judge Hittner which lasted nearly four days, during which he acted as his own attorney. The United States presented a total of 325 trial exhibits and 12 witnesses. During the trial, Bujol did not testify on his own behalf nor did he present any witnesses. Closing arguments were completed on Thursday, Nov. 10, at which time the court requested the weekend to consider all the evidence. This afternoon, Judge Hittner presented his ruling, finding Bujol guilty on both counts with which he was charged – attempt to provide material support or resources to a designated foreign terrorist organization as well as aggravated identity theft.

The charges against Bujol resulted from a long-term investigation conducted by the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force. The investigation, which began in 2009, involved a confidential human source (CHS) who purported to be an AQAP recruiter interested in helping Bujol pursue his goal of conducting “violent jihad.” Bujol was arrested on May 30, 2010, after boarding a ship docked at the Port of Houston, which Bujol believed was bound for Algeria where he would stay at an Al Qaeda safe house before continuing on to Yemen. Bujol intended to stow away to join AQAP and to deliver items the CHS gave him to AQAP. AQAP was designated a foreign terrorist organization as the term is used in Title 18, United States Code, Section 2339B(g)(6) and Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act by the United States Secretary of State on Jan. 19, 2010.

Evidence at trial revealed that Bujol had been in contact with Anwar Al-Aulaqi, a now-deceased Yemeni-American AQAP associate and a proponent of violent jihad against the United States. Bujol had asked Al-Aulaqi for advice on raising money for the “mujahideen” without attracting police attention and on his duty as a Muslim to make “violent jihad.” Al-Aulaqi replied to Bujol’s e-mails by sending Bujol a document entitled “42 Ways of Supporting Jihad,” which asserted that “jihad’ is the greatest deed in Islam…[and] obligatory on every Muslim.” Court records indicated that the “jihad” Al-Aulaqi advocated involved violence and killing. The document implored Muslims, among other things, to conduct firearms training, improve their physical fitness for guerrilla warfare and to make “violent jihad.”

In 2009, Bujol made three attempts to depart the United States for the Middle East, but law enforcement, believing these were Bujol’s efforts to make “violent jihad,” thwarted him each time he tried to leave. Concerned about Bujol’s violent intentions and to further the investigation, agents arranged for a CHS to meet Bujol. Bujol eventually told the CHS he desired to fight with the “mujahideen.” The CHS, who testified at trial, told Bujol that he recruited people for AQAP and could help him. Each time the CHS told him he would be joining AQAP, Bujol replied by saying “God willing” in Arabic.

Records indicated that to prove his worth to the CHS and AQAP, Bujol performed numerous purported “training exercises” often involving surveillance detection and covert means of communication. Moreover, Bujol began to e-mail the CHS military manuals and articles on military unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) that he had found on the Internet, explaining to the CHS how the information could be helpful to AQAP. In a running conversation about UAVs, Bujol repeatedly told the CHS, often using metaphorical language, that AQAP should attack the human beings essential to operate the UAVs instead of attacking the UAVs themselves. Bujol suggested multiple targets, including one in the Southern District of Texas.

On May 30, 2010, the CHS contacted Bujol with a code word they previously agreed would signal the beginning of Bujol’s travel to the Middle East to join AQAP. They drove together to the Port of Houston where the CHS told Bujol he would stow-away on a ship bound for Algeria. After a short stay in Algeria for training, the CHS told Bujol he would travel to Yemen to fight for AQAP. The CHS gave Bujol various items to carry to AQAP’s purported operative in Algeria, which included two public access restricted military manuals, global position system receivers, pre-paid international calling cards, SIM cards and approximately 2,000 in Euros, among other items. Bujol secured these items in his baggage and quickly boarded the ship. Minutes after stowing away in a room on board the ship, agents took him into custody without incident.

Simultaneously, agents executed a search warrant on his apartment and his laptop computer. On the computer, agents found a home-made video montage of still photographs, including images of Osama bin Laden, Najibullah Zazi and multiple armed “mujahideen” fighters, which Bujol narrated. On the video, which was offered into evidence at trial, he addressed his words to his wife, explaining that he had left her suddenly and without forewarning to pursue “jihad.” Bujol told her he would likely not see her until the afterlife.

The aggravated identity theft charge, of which he was also convicted, stemmed from a false transportation worker identity card (purporting to be a card issued by the Transportation Security Administration) that Bujol possessed to access the Port of Houston. Bujol supplied the CHS with a passport photo and a false name and the CHS used these materials to acquire the false card for use in the sting operation. On the night of the operation, Bujol used the false card to gain access to the port.

Bujol has been in federal custody since his May 30, 2010, arrest and will remain in custody pending his sentencing, at which time he faces a maximum of 15 years in federal prison for the terrorism charge and an additional five years for the aggravated identity theft conviction as well as a $250,000 fine.

This multi-agency investigation was conducted by the U.S. Attorney’s Office; the Department of Justice’s Counterterrorism Section; the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force in Bryan, Texas — comprised of the Brazos County Sheriff’s Office, the Texas A&M University Police Department, the Bryan Police Department, the U.S. States Secret Service, the Waller County Sheriff’s Office and the College Station Police Department. Other investigating agencies were the Houston FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force, the Prairie View A&M University Department of Public Safety, the New Jersey State Police, the Coast Guard Investigative Service, Immigration and Customs Enforcement – Homeland Security Investigations, Houston Police Department and the Canada Border Services Agency.

The case was prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Mark McIntyre and Craig Feazel, as well as Garrett Heenan, Trial Attorney from the Counterterrorism Section of the Justice Department’s National Security Division, and former Assistant U.S. Attorney Mark W. White III.


nationalsecuritylaw United States v. El Kebir (E.D.N.Y.)

November 11, 2011

* United States v. El-Kebir (E.D.N.Y.)

Abdeladim El-Kabir was arrested in Germany, along with two other men, back in April of this year. German officials at the time alleged that the men were planning to build a bomb to use somewhere in Europe; that there was correspondence indicating that this was an al Qaeda-related group; and that the men had trained at a camp in Waziristan, Pakistan. It appears that Germany had charged him only with membership in a terrorist organization, however. Der Spiegel provides much more information about his al Qaeda links, in a story near the time of his original arrest, here.

A grand jury in Brooklyn has now indicted El-Kabir. The indictment, here, is very brief. The first count is a material support conspiracy charge under 18 USC 2339B, and the second count is conspiracy to carry a destructive device or firearm in connection with a crime of violence (that crime being the one alleged in the first count).

Extradition proceedings will follow, though it is interesting to ponder whether and why Germany would send him here rather than prosecute him itself.


nationalsecuritylaw upcoming event: “Barriers and Innovations in Civil Rights Litigation Since 9/11” (UT, Feb. 3, 2012)

November 11, 2011

Save the Date_hyperlink.pdf


nationalsecuritylaw Call for papers on the ICC

November 9, 2011

* Call for papers

The New England Journal of International and Comparative Law seeks papers concerning the ICC, in view of the upcoming 10th anniversary of the Rome Statute’s entry into force. All the details are in the attached pdf. Note that they are seeking short pieces, and the deadline for submissions is February 1st, 2012.

Call for Papers.pdf


nationalsecuritylaw United States v. Abdo (W.D. Tex. Nov. 8, 2011) (superseding indictment)

November 9, 2011

* United States v. Abdo (W.D. Tex. Nov. 8, 2011) (superseding indictment)

The superseding indictment is attached, and the press release appears below:

WACO, Texas – U.S. Attorney Robert Pitman and FBI Special Agent in Charge Cory B. Nelson announced that 21-year-old Naser Jason Abdo faces new charges in connection with a July bomb plot in Killeen, Texas.

This afternoon, a federal grand jury in Waco, Texas, returned a superseding indictment against Abdo charging him with one count of attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction; one count of attempted murder of officers or employees of the United States, two counts of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a federal crime of violence; and two counts of possession of a destructive device in furtherance of a federal crime of violence.

The six-count superseding indictment specifically alleges that on July 27, 2011, Abdo unlawfully attempted to create and detonate a bomb in an attempt to kill, with pre-meditation and malice aforethought, members of the uniformed services of the United States and to shoot survivors of said detonation with a firearm. The indictment further alleges that on July 27, 2011, Abdo did knowingly possess a .40 caliber semi-automatic pistol while carrying out his plot.

According to court records, officers with the Killeen Police Department arrested Abdo on July 27, 2011. At the time of his arrest, the defendant, an absent without leave (AWOL) soldier from Fort Campbell, Ky., was in possession of the handgun, plus instructions on how to build a bomb as well as bomb-making components. Court documents also allege that Abdo intended to detonate the destructive device inside an unspecified restaurant frequented by soldiers from Fort Hood.

The federal grand jury returned an initial indictment in this case on Aug. 9, 2011. While those charges — possession of an unregistered destructive device, possession of a firearm by a fugitive from justice and possession of ammunition by a fugitive from justice — remain in effect, prosecutors will first proceed on the charges contained in the superseding indictment.

Abdo remains in federal custody. If convicted of the charges contained in the superseding indictment, Abdo faces up to life in federal prison for the attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction charge; up to 20 years in federal prison for the attempted murder charge; a mandatory 30 years in prison for each possession of a destructive device in furtherance of a federal crime of violence charge; and, a mandatory five years in federal prison for each possession of a firearm in furtherance of a federal crime of violence charge.

This case is being investigated by agents with the FBI together with U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; Killeen Police Department; and the Texas Department of Public Safety. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Mark Frazier and Gregg Sofer are prosecuting this case on behalf of the government.

An indictment is merely a charge and should not be considered as evidence of guilt. The defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty in a court of law.

Abdo_superseding_indictment_Waco11cr00182.pdf


nationalsecuritylaw forthcoming scholarship

November 8, 2011

1. Volume 87 of the Naval War College Blue Book, “International Law and the Changing Character of War”

The Naval War College International Law Department recently published volume 87 of its International Law Studies "Blue Book" series. The Blue Book has served as an invaluable resource for scholars and practitioners of international law since 1901. Volume 87 is entitled "International Law and the Changing Character of War." It includes scholarly papers by Prof Mike Schmitt, Prof Yoram Dinstein, and Dr. Nicholas Rostow among many other key leaders in the field. A copy of volume 87 may be downloaded from Naval War College website (ILD or (401) 841-4949.

PART I: OPENING ADDRESS

I Combating Terrorists: Legal Challenges in the Post-9/11 World

Nicholas Rostow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

PART II: OVERVIEW: INTERNATIONAL LAW CHALLENGES IN

ASYMMETRICALWAR

II Mission Impossible? International Law and the Changing

Character of War

John F. Murphy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

PART III: THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF THE BATTLEFIELD: THE USE OF

FORCE IN CYBERSPACE

III Cyber Attacks as “Force” under UN Charter Article 2(4)

Matthew C. Waxman. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

IV Low-Intensity Computer Network Attack and Self-Defense

Sean Watts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

V Cyber Operations and the Jus in Bello: Key Issues

Michael N. Schmitt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

PART IV: LUNCHEON ADDRESS

VI Who May Be Held? Military Detention through the Habeas Lens

Robert M. Chesney. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

PART V: THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF THE PARTICIPANTS INWAR:

CIVILIANIZATION OFWARFIGHTING AND THE CONCEPT OF “DIRECT

PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES”

VII The Changing Character of the Participants in War:

Civilianization ofWarfighting and the Concept of “Direct

Participation in Hostilities”

Charles Garraway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177

VIII Direct Participation in Hostilities and the Interoperability of the

Law of Armed Conflict and Human Rights Law

Françoise J. Hampson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187

PART VI: THE CHANGING CHARACTER OFWEAPON SYSTEMS: UNMANNED

SYSTEMS/UNMANNED VEHICLES

IX Use of Unmanned Systems to Combat Terrorism

Raul A. “Pete” Pedrozo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217

X New Technology and the Law of Armed Conflict

Darren M. Stewart. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271

PART VII: THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF TACTICS: LAWFARE IN

ASYMMETRICAL CONFLICTS

XI The Law of Armed Conflict in Asymmetric Urban Armed

Conflict

David E. Graham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301

XII Lawfare Today . . . and Tomorrow

Charles J. Dunlap, Jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315

XIII The Age of Lawfare

Dale Stephens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327

XIV Warning Civilians Prior to Attack under International Law:

Theory and Practice

Pnina Sharvit Baruch and Noam Neuman. . . . . . . . . . . . . 359

PART VIII: THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF LEGAL SCRUTINY: RULE SET,

INVESTIGATION, AND ENFORCEMENT IN ASYMMETRICAL CONFLICTS

XV The Changing Character of Public Legal Scrutiny of Operations

Rob McLaughlin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 415

XVI Litigating HowWe Fight

Ashley S. Deeks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 427

XVII Asymmetric Warfare: How to Respond?

Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 463

PART IX: CLOSING ADDRESS

XVIII Concluding Remarks: LOAC and Attempts to Abuse or

Subvert It

Yoram Dinstein . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 483

Appendix—Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 497

Index. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 507

2. Virtual Checkpoints and Cyber-Terry Stops: Digital Scans to Protect the Nation’s Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources

Scott J. Glick*

Journal of National Security Law and Policy (forthcoming Vol. 6:1)

The cybersecurity risks to the nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources are significant and increasing every day. While a sound legal basis exists for the government to use computer intrusion detection technology to protect its own networks, critical infrastructure and key resources which are primarily owned by the private sector are governed by a different set of constitutional principles and laws. This Article explores the potential for a new cybersecurity exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant and individualized suspicion requirements. By viewing cybersecurity through a protective Fourth Amendment lens, as opposed to a criminal, intelligence, or military lens, fairly well established legal frameworks from the physical world can be applied to cyberspace to enable the government to use technology to identify malicious digital codes that may be attacking the nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources without running afoul of the Fourth Amendment. The Article argues that reasonable and limited digital scans at virtual checkpoints in cyberspace, which are binary and do not initially expose the contents of the communications to human review, are a constitutional and effective way to minimize the cybersecurity risks to the nation. The Article proposes that the Congress consider and enact sensible new legislation that will specifically enable the government to take remedial and other protective actions in cyberspace within the constitutional framework that has enabled this nation to prosper. * Senior Counsel, National Security Division, U.S. Department of Justice. This article has been reviewed for publication by the Justice Department in accordance with 28 C.F.R. § 17.18. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Justice Department.


nationalsecuritylaw upcoming event: “The Internet in Bello: Cyber War Law, Ethics, and Policy” (Berkeley Law, Friday Nov. 18)

November 8, 2011

* upcoming event: "The Internet in Bello: Cyber War Law, Ethics, and Policy" (Berkeley Law, Friday Nov. 18)

Registration is now open online for the one-day seminar on "The Internet

in Bello: Cyber War Law, Ethics & Policy", Friday 18 November at

Berkeley Law. http://www.law.berkeley.edu/11804.htm. The seminar is

free, but seating is limited so registration is required. MCLE credit

will be available. Please feel free to pass this invitation along to

interested colleagues and students.

The seminar is co-sponsored by Berkeley’s Miller Institute for Global

Challenges and the Law, the International Committee of the Red Cross,

the American Society of International Law’s Lieber Society on the Law of

Armed Conflict, and the Berkeley Center for Law and Technology.

Our keynote speaker is Lt. Gen. Robert Schmidle, Jr, USMC, Deputy

Commander, U.S. Cyber Command. Other speakers include Sir Daniel

Bethlehem KCMG QC, former principal legal adviser to the UK Foreign

Office, as well as Col. Gary Brown (CyberCom), David Caron (Berkeley),

Andrew Carswell (ICRC), Lt. Col. Pete Hayden (Office of Chairman, Joint

Chiefs of Staff), Kate Jastram (Berkeley), Eric Talbot Jensen (BYU),

Stephen Maurer (Berkeley), Michael Nacht (Berkeley), Anne Quintin

(ICRC), Abraham Sofaer (Stanford), Beth van Schaack (Santa Clara), Lt.

Cdr. Paul Walker (CyberCom), and Sean Watts (Creighton).

This is a great opportunity to hear from scholars and practitioners of

international law and cyber war. If you have any questions, please

write to kjastram, or Karen Chin, kchin.


nationalsecuritylaw link for article on the Miranda public safety exception

November 3, 2011

Regarding the first article below (Joanna Wright, Mirandizing Terrorists), it turns out that the SSRN page contains only the abstract but not the article itself. My apologies for not spotting that earlier. Fortunately, the article itself is available on Columbia’s website, here.

From: Robert Chesney [mailto:rchesney@law.utexas.edu]
Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2011 8:02 AM
To: nationalsecuritylaw@utlists.utexas.edu
Subject: [nationalsecuritylaw] forthcoming scholarship

"Mirandizing Terrorists? An Empirical Analysis of the Public Safety Exception"

Columbia Law Review, Vol. 111, No. 1, 2011

JOANNA WRIGHT, Columbia Law Review
Email: joanna.wright

The Quarles Public Safety Exception (“PSE”) exempts testimony from Miranda’s exclusionary rule and admits un-Mirandized statements made in response to questions intended to secure public safety. Recently, legislators, advocates, and academics have questioned the PSE’s ability to accommodate the unique challenges of terrorist interrogations, calling for legislative modification to or the elimination of suspected terrorists’ constitutional right to Miranda warnings. Before concluding that such drastic measures are necessary, this Note advocates for a logical, grounded assessment of the judiciary’s actual application of the PSE, learning as much as possible from the past case law to gauge exactly how courts utilize the PSE. This analysis examines whether or not the PSE is, in fact, capable of handling the unique challenges of terrorist interrogations. This Note conducts an empirical study of the PSE, systematically categorizing every state and federal court opinion that definitively asserts the appropriate application of the PSE, filtering the opinions through different metrics and variables relevant to terrorist interrogations. Ultimately, this Note concludes that the PSE is a fact-sensitive, capacious device equipped to properly handle the unique nature of terrorist interrogations, due largely to its malleability in the hands of the courts. Part I tracks the doctrinal evolution of confessions law leading up to the PSE. Part II presents the results of an empirical examination of the entire universe of Quarles case law. Part III pinpoints individual opinions that showcase features of the PSE particularly relevant to the debate. The data and analysis show, in conclusion, that Miranda warnings coupled with the PSE empower law enforcement to adequately interrogate suspected terrorists.

"Use It and Lose It": An Exploration of Unused Counterterrorism Laws and Implications for Future Counterterrorism Policies

Stephanie Cooper Blum

Department of Homeland Security ; Michigan State University

Lewis & Clark Law Review, Forthcoming 2012

This Article explores why the Executive Branch has declined to use three counterterrorism laws–the Alien Terrorist Removal Court, Section 412 of the Patriot Act, and the lone-wolf amendment to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act–and suggests that the reason may be fear that the laws are unconstitutional and, paradoxically, that in some cases they provide too many rights to suspected alien terrorists. The Article also offers three insights from the non-use of counterterrorism laws: (1) that Congress may be passing political responses instead of needed counterterrorism protection; (2) that the judicial branch is using these laws to narrow the scope of other counterterrorism measures, and (3) that we may have a potential gap in security. In this way, the study of unused counterterrorism laws can prove just as insightful and helpful an exercise as the more traditional analysis of frequently-used counterterrorism measures

"Self Defense Targeting: Conflict Classification or Willful Blindness?"

GEOFFREY S. CORN, South Texas College of Law
Email: gcorn

Willful blindness is a criminal law evidentiary concept used when knowledge of a particular fact or result is at issue. It allows the finder of fact to impute such knowledge to a criminal defendant when the evidence indicates the defendant willfully avoided learning true facts in the face of obvious indicators. In essence, it transforms a reckless failure to verify critical facts into knowledge of those facts. This doctrine seems to almost perfectly characterize the apparent effort to avoid the jus in bello classification of counter-terror military operations by relying on the overarching jus ad bellum legal justification for these operations. This so called ‘self-defense targeting’ concept, or what Professor Kenneth Anderson calls ‘naked self-defense,’ appears to provide the U.S. legal framework for employing combat power to destroy or disrupt the capabilities of transnational terrorist operatives. This essay will address why reliance on this self-defense targeting concept is in essence an exercise in international legal willful blindness, and why as a result the jus in bello classification of such operations should be imputed by the invocation of jus ad bellum self-defense.

The recent attack on Osama Bin Laden’s compound in Pakistan has exposed in stark relief the importance of defining the legal framework applicable to the use of military force as a counter-terrorism tool. The initial focus of the public debate generated by the attack was the relative legitimacy of the U.S. invocation of the inherent right of self-defense to launch a non-consensual operation within the sovereign territory of Pakistan. However, that focus soon shifted to another critical legal question: even assuming the legitimacy of this invocation, what law regulated the execution of the operation? By virtue of his role as the leader of al Qaeda, was Bin Laden a lawful military objective within the meaning of the law of armed conflict, and thereby subject to attack with deadly force as a measure of first resort? Or was he merely an international criminal, subject to a much more limited law enforcement use of force authority? The duality of the jus belli issues implicated by the attack generated a two prong legal critique: first, did the mission violate the international legal prohibition against use of force (jus ad bellum)? Second, did the mission trigger the law of armed conflict, or was the amount of force employed during the mission resulting in Bin Laden’s death excessive to that which was necessary to apprehend him? The self-defense targeting theory failed to sufficiently address this duality.

Bin Laden and Awlaki: Lawful Targets

Major Shane Reeves and Lieutenant Colonel Jeremy Marsh

Harvard International Review (Oct. 2011)

[From the introduction:] Many have challenged the legality of the 2011 United States’ operations that resulted in the deaths of Osama Bin Laden and Anwar al-Awlaki. Pakistan condemned the Bin Laden operation as a violation of international law; human rights advocates asserted that each man should have been captured instead of killed; and others claimed the operations were unlawful “assassinations” or, in the case of Awlaki, a violation of his constitutional rights as an American citizen. These criticisms are all without merit. ….

"After "Top Gun": How Drone Strikes Impact the Law of War"

University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, Vol. 33, 2012

LAURIE R. BLANK, Emory University School of Law
Email: lblank

The U.S. drone program has sparked extensive and intense public commentary –academic, policy-oriented, and media – regarding targeted killing of terrorist operatives using armed drones. However, such attacks are only a small portion of how drones are used and how they can be used. Drones are used extensively for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), including identification of targets, and to support troops on the ground. This article focuses on contemporary jus in bello questions posed by the use of drones and will analyze drones as a weapons system within the law of armed conflict, leaving the jus ad bellum questions aside.The first section will address foundational questions regarding the application of the law of armed conflict to drones, including the legality of armed drones as a weapons system and their use in accordance with the key law of armed conflict requirements of distinction, proportionality and precautions in attack. Although many argue that the “joystick mentality" of remotely piloted aircraft and weapons can lead to desensitization and a decreased likelihood of adherence to international norms, the examination here demonstrates that drones indeed offer extensive and enhanced opportunities for compliance with the law of armed conflict. In the second section, this article will explore how the burgeoning use of armed drones raises new questions for some traditional concepts and categories within the law of armed conflict, such as the status of persons and the geographical locus of attacks and hostilities and potentially new challenges in the implementation of distinction and proportionality. Notwithstanding significant hue and cry regarding their use over the past several years, the use of armed drones offers the potential for improved law of armed conflict compliance and protection of civilians during armed conflict.

"Prosecuting Terrorism in International Tribunals"

Emory International Law Review, Vol. 24, No. 2, 2010

JOHAN VAN DER VYVER, Emory University School of Law
Email: jvand02

Terrorism can be defined as acts of violence directed against a civilian population or civilian objects for the purpose of spreading terror among civilians and with a view to intimidating persons in authority to submit to the demands of the perpetrators. Terrorism has been condemned by the international community and has indeed been recognized as a crime under customary international law. However, there are still those who believe that persons engaged in a war of liberation — that is, an armed struggle against colonial rule, foreign domination, or a racist regime — are entitled to resort to acts of terror in order to achieve their “noble objectives”, but following September 11th, that view has been discredited in several resolutions of the General Assembly on the United Nations and of the Security Council.

Terrorism is not included in the subject-matter jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) but can be prosecuted in the ICC as an added component of war crimes such as directing an attack against individual civilians not taking a direct part in hostilities. Terrorism is also not expressly included in the subject-matter jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) but has been prosecuted in the ICTY under provisions in the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 which prohibit acts of violence directed against civilians for the purpose of spreading terror in the civilian population. It should be noted, though, that terrorism does not only require the special intent to spread terror among the civilian population but also the further special intent of intimidating persons in authority to give in to the demands of the terrorists.

"Direct Versus Indirect is Not the Question: Assessing the Legality of In-Person and Drone Targeted Strikes"

NATASHA MARUSJA SAPUTO, affiliation not provided to SSRN
Email: natashenkah

The use of drones to carry out targeted strikes against alleged members of al-Qaeda and the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban in States – such as Pakistan and Yemen – outside the direct theater of combat where armed conflict is occurring for Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan is extraordinarily controversial. Much of the controversy stems from the fact that there is no consensus as to the applicable legal framework to evaluate the legality of such strikes. Conversely, the use of in-person strike teams purportedly commissioned by Israel to carry out targeted strikes against alleged members of hostile organizations and foreign governments deemed to be a threat to Israel in States in which no armed conflict is occurring is roundly condemned by the vast majority of the international community. This divergence is notable because upon closer examination the two types of strikes may not be meaningfully dissimilar from a legal standpoint.


nationalsecuritylaw forthcoming scholarship

November 3, 2011

"Mirandizing Terrorists? An Empirical Analysis of the Public Safety Exception"

Columbia Law Review, Vol. 111, No. 1, 2011

JOANNA WRIGHT, Columbia Law Review
Email: joanna.wright

The Quarles Public Safety Exception (“PSE”) exempts testimony from Miranda’s exclusionary rule and admits un-Mirandized statements made in response to questions intended to secure public safety. Recently, legislators, advocates, and academics have questioned the PSE’s ability to accommodate the unique challenges of terrorist interrogations, calling for legislative modification to or the elimination of suspected terrorists’ constitutional right to Miranda warnings. Before concluding that such drastic measures are necessary, this Note advocates for a logical, grounded assessment of the judiciary’s actual application of the PSE, learning as much as possible from the past case law to gauge exactly how courts utilize the PSE. This analysis examines whether or not the PSE is, in fact, capable of handling the unique challenges of terrorist interrogations. This Note conducts an empirical study of the PSE, systematically categorizing every state and federal court opinion that definitively asserts the appropriate application of the PSE, filtering the opinions through different metrics and variables relevant to terrorist interrogations. Ultimately, this Note concludes that the PSE is a fact-sensitive, capacious device equipped to properly handle the unique nature of terrorist interrogations, due largely to its malleability in the hands of the courts. Part I tracks the doctrinal evolution of confessions law leading up to the PSE. Part II presents the results of an empirical examination of the entire universe of Quarles case law. Part III pinpoints individual opinions that showcase features of the PSE particularly relevant to the debate. The data and analysis show, in conclusion, that Miranda warnings coupled with the PSE empower law enforcement to adequately interrogate suspected terrorists.

"Use It and Lose It": An Exploration of Unused Counterterrorism Laws and Implications for Future Counterterrorism Policies

Stephanie Cooper Blum

Department of Homeland Security ; Michigan State University

Lewis & Clark Law Review, Forthcoming 2012

This Article explores why the Executive Branch has declined to use three counterterrorism laws–the Alien Terrorist Removal Court, Section 412 of the Patriot Act, and the lone-wolf amendment to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act–and suggests that the reason may be fear that the laws are unconstitutional and, paradoxically, that in some cases they provide too many rights to suspected alien terrorists. The Article also offers three insights from the non-use of counterterrorism laws: (1) that Congress may be passing political responses instead of needed counterterrorism protection; (2) that the judicial branch is using these laws to narrow the scope of other counterterrorism measures, and (3) that we may have a potential gap in security. In this way, the study of unused counterterrorism laws can prove just as insightful and helpful an exercise as the more traditional analysis of frequently-used counterterrorism measures

"Self Defense Targeting: Conflict Classification or Willful Blindness?"

GEOFFREY S. CORN, South Texas College of Law
Email: gcorn

Willful blindness is a criminal law evidentiary concept used when knowledge of a particular fact or result is at issue. It allows the finder of fact to impute such knowledge to a criminal defendant when the evidence indicates the defendant willfully avoided learning true facts in the face of obvious indicators. In essence, it transforms a reckless failure to verify critical facts into knowledge of those facts. This doctrine seems to almost perfectly characterize the apparent effort to avoid the jus in bello classification of counter-terror military operations by relying on the overarching jus ad bellum legal justification for these operations. This so called ‘self-defense targeting’ concept, or what Professor Kenneth Anderson calls ‘naked self-defense,’ appears to provide the U.S. legal framework for employing combat power to destroy or disrupt the capabilities of transnational terrorist operatives. This essay will address why reliance on this self-defense targeting concept is in essence an exercise in international legal willful blindness, and why as a result the jus in bello classification of such operations should be imputed by the invocation of jus ad bellum self-defense.

The recent attack on Osama Bin Laden’s compound in Pakistan has exposed in stark relief the importance of defining the legal framework applicable to the use of military force as a counter-terrorism tool. The initial focus of the public debate generated by the attack was the relative legitimacy of the U.S. invocation of the inherent right of self-defense to launch a non-consensual operation within the sovereign territory of Pakistan. However, that focus soon shifted to another critical legal question: even assuming the legitimacy of this invocation, what law regulated the execution of the operation? By virtue of his role as the leader of al Qaeda, was Bin Laden a lawful military objective within the meaning of the law of armed conflict, and thereby subject to attack with deadly force as a measure of first resort? Or was he merely an international criminal, subject to a much more limited law enforcement use of force authority? The duality of the jus belli issues implicated by the attack generated a two prong legal critique: first, did the mission violate the international legal prohibition against use of force (jus ad bellum)? Second, did the mission trigger the law of armed conflict, or was the amount of force employed during the mission resulting in Bin Laden’s death excessive to that which was necessary to apprehend him? The self-defense targeting theory failed to sufficiently address this duality.

Bin Laden and Awlaki: Lawful Targets

Major Shane Reeves and Lieutenant Colonel Jeremy Marsh

Harvard International Review (Oct. 2011)

[From the introduction:] Many have challenged the legality of the 2011 United States’ operations that resulted in the deaths of Osama Bin Laden and Anwar al-Awlaki. Pakistan condemned the Bin Laden operation as a violation of international law; human rights advocates asserted that each man should have been captured instead of killed; and others claimed the operations were unlawful “assassinations” or, in the case of Awlaki, a violation of his constitutional rights as an American citizen. These criticisms are all without merit. ….

"After "Top Gun": How Drone Strikes Impact the Law of War"

University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, Vol. 33, 2012

LAURIE R. BLANK, Emory University School of Law
Email: lblank

The U.S. drone program has sparked extensive and intense public commentary –academic, policy-oriented, and media – regarding targeted killing of terrorist operatives using armed drones. However, such attacks are only a small portion of how drones are used and how they can be used. Drones are used extensively for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), including identification of targets, and to support troops on the ground. This article focuses on contemporary jus in bello questions posed by the use of drones and will analyze drones as a weapons system within the law of armed conflict, leaving the jus ad bellum questions aside.The first section will address foundational questions regarding the application of the law of armed conflict to drones, including the legality of armed drones as a weapons system and their use in accordance with the key law of armed conflict requirements of distinction, proportionality and precautions in attack. Although many argue that the “joystick mentality" of remotely piloted aircraft and weapons can lead to desensitization and a decreased likelihood of adherence to international norms, the examination here demonstrates that drones indeed offer extensive and enhanced opportunities for compliance with the law of armed conflict. In the second section, this article will explore how the burgeoning use of armed drones raises new questions for some traditional concepts and categories within the law of armed conflict, such as the status of persons and the geographical locus of attacks and hostilities and potentially new challenges in the implementation of distinction and proportionality. Notwithstanding significant hue and cry regarding their use over the past several years, the use of armed drones offers the potential for improved law of armed conflict compliance and protection of civilians during armed conflict.

"Prosecuting Terrorism in International Tribunals"

Emory International Law Review, Vol. 24, No. 2, 2010

JOHAN VAN DER VYVER, Emory University School of Law
Email: jvand02

Terrorism can be defined as acts of violence directed against a civilian population or civilian objects for the purpose of spreading terror among civilians and with a view to intimidating persons in authority to submit to the demands of the perpetrators. Terrorism has been condemned by the international community and has indeed been recognized as a crime under customary international law. However, there are still those who believe that persons engaged in a war of liberation — that is, an armed struggle against colonial rule, foreign domination, or a racist regime — are entitled to resort to acts of terror in order to achieve their “noble objectives”, but following September 11th, that view has been discredited in several resolutions of the General Assembly on the United Nations and of the Security Council.

Terrorism is not included in the subject-matter jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) but can be prosecuted in the ICC as an added component of war crimes such as directing an attack against individual civilians not taking a direct part in hostilities. Terrorism is also not expressly included in the subject-matter jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) but has been prosecuted in the ICTY under provisions in the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 which prohibit acts of violence directed against civilians for the purpose of spreading terror in the civilian population. It should be noted, though, that terrorism does not only require the special intent to spread terror among the civilian population but also the further special intent of intimidating persons in authority to give in to the demands of the terrorists.

"Direct Versus Indirect is Not the Question: Assessing the Legality of In-Person and Drone Targeted Strikes"

NATASHA MARUSJA SAPUTO, affiliation not provided to SSRN
Email: natashenkah

The use of drones to carry out targeted strikes against alleged members of al-Qaeda and the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban in States – such as Pakistan and Yemen – outside the direct theater of combat where armed conflict is occurring for Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan is extraordinarily controversial. Much of the controversy stems from the fact that there is no consensus as to the applicable legal framework to evaluate the legality of such strikes. Conversely, the use of in-person strike teams purportedly commissioned by Israel to carry out targeted strikes against alleged members of hostile organizations and foreign governments deemed to be a threat to Israel in States in which no armed conflict is occurring is roundly condemned by the vast majority of the international community. This divergence is notable because upon closer examination the two types of strikes may not be meaningfully dissimilar from a legal standpoint.


nationalsecuritylaw United States v. al-Nashiri (Mil. Com. Oct. 27, 2011) (government response to defense motion on consequences of acquittal)

November 2, 2011

* United States v. al-Nashiri (Mil. Com. Oct. 27, 2011) (government response to defense motion on consequences of acquittal)

The government’s response brief is now available here, along with a bit of commentary.