nationalsecuritylaw scholarship on the public-safety exception

I circulated this some time back, but for obvious reasons it seems worth recirculating now:

Mirandizing Terrorists? An Empirical Analysis of the Public Safety Exception

Joanna Wright

Columbia Law Review

October 12, 2011

Columbia Law Review, Vol. 111, p. 1296, 2011

Abstract:
The Quarles Public Safety Exception (“PSE”) exempts testimony from Miranda’s exclusionary rule and admits un-Mirandized statements made in response to questions intended to secure public safety. Recently, legislators, advocates, and academics have questioned the PSE’s ability to accommodate the unique challenges of terrorist interrogations, calling for legislative modification to or the elimination of suspected terrorists’ constitutional right to Miranda warnings. Before concluding that such drastic measures are necessary, this Note advocates for a logical, grounded assessment of the judiciary’s actual application of the PSE, learning as much as possible from the past case law to gauge exactly how courts utilize the PSE. This analysis examines whether or not the PSE is, in fact, capable of handling the unique challenges of terrorist interrogations. This Note conducts an empirical study of the PSE, systematically categorizing every state and federal court opinion that definitively asserts the appropriate application of the PSE, filtering the opinions through different metrics and variables relevant to terrorist interrogations. Ultimately, this Note concludes that the PSE is a fact-sensitive, capacious device equipped to properly handle the unique nature of terrorist interrogations, due largely to its malleability in the hands of the courts. Part I tracks the doctrinal evolution of confessions law leading up to the PSE. Part II presents the results of an empirical examination of the entire universe of Quarles case law. Part III pinpoints individual opinions that showcase features of the PSE particularly relevant to the debate. The data and analysis show, in conclusion, that Miranda warnings coupled with the PSE empower law enforcement to adequately interrogate suspected terrorists.

nationalsecuritylaw call for papers: Fordham Urban Law Journal, Terrorism and Cities

The Fordham Urban Law Journal has decided to focus an issue on “The New Normal: The Lasting Effect of Terrorism on Our Cities.” This seems like a very timely and interesting idea, and if you are interested please have a look at the attached call for papers for more details.

ArticleSoliciation_Terrorism.pdf

nationalsecuritylaw United States v. Tsarnaev (D. Mass. Apr. 15, 2013)

The criminal complaint against Dzhokar Tsarnaev is attached, and the press release appears below:

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criminal complaint 130421 1847.pdf

nationalsecuritylaw upcoming event: Targeted Killings Away From a “hot” Battlefield: Exploring the Legal Issues

Targeted Killings Away From a “hot” Battlefield: Exploring the Legal Issues Tuesday, May 28, 2013 6:00 pm-7:30 pm Registration: There is no charge for this program. Register Targeted killings away from a “hot” battlefield have provoked controversy. Although there has been some public disclosure, the topic remains murky and opaque. This panel, composed of leading experts, aims to address two key questions: (1) what are the proper legal standards to guide decisions about targeted killing outside a combat zone; and (2) who should be involved in authorizing or reviewing such decisions. Moderator: JAMES J. BENJAMIN, JR., Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP Speakers: HON. JAMES ROBERTSON, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia (retired); MATTHEW C. WAXMAN, Professor of Law and Faculty Co-Chair,Roger Hertog Program on Law and National Security, Columbia Law School; SARAH H. CLEVELAND, Louis Henkin Professor in Human and Constitutional Rights; Faculty Co-Dir., Human Rights Institute, Columbia Law School; HINA SHAMSI, Director, ACLU National Security Project Sponsored by: Task Force on National Security and the Rule of Law, Jim Benjamin, Chair Event Location: 42 West 44th St. (bet. 5th & 6th Ave.)

nationalsecuritylaw upcoming event on targeted killing

Targeted Killings Away From a “hot” Battlefield: Exploring the Legal Issues
Tuesday, May 28, 2013 6:00 pm-7:30 pm
Event Location: 42 West 44th St. (bet. 5th & 6th Ave.)

Registration:
There is no charge for this program. Register

Targeted killings away from a “hot” battlefield have provoked controversy. Although there has been some public disclosure, the topic remains murky and opaque. This panel, composed of leading experts, aims to address two key questions: (1) what are the proper legal standards to guide decisions about targeted killing outside a combat zone; and (2) who should be involved in authorizing or reviewing such decisions.

Moderator: JAMES J. BENJAMIN, JR., Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP

Speakers: HON. JAMES ROBERTSON, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia (retired); MATTHEW C. WAXMAN, Professor of Law and Faculty Co-Chair,Roger Hertog Program on Law and National Security, Columbia Law School; SARAH H. CLEVELAND, Louis Henkin Professor in Human and Constitutional Rights; Faculty Co-Dir., Human Rights Institute, Columbia Law School; HINA SHAMSI, Director, ACLU National Security Project

Sponsored by: Task Force on National Security and the Rule of Law, Jim Benjamin, Chair

nationalsecuritylaw upcoming USIP three-day course in IHL and IHRL

From the US Institute of Peace:

The United States Institute of Peace is offering a course on International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights as part of its highly regarded Academy for International Conflict Management and Peacebuilding. The Academy provides practitioner-oriented education, training, and resources via facilities at USIP’s Washington headquarters, mobile training in conflict zones abroad, and online distance education and training.

This course on IHL and HR runs May 14-16, 2013 and will focus on key questions: Why do we have these bodies of law? How do they apply? What is the practical impact of human rights and humanitarian law in conflict-affected states? How do these two bodies of law interact? How are human rights and international humanitarian law relevant to practitioner’s work in the field? The three-day course will be delivered through a variety of methodologies that seek to maximize the learning experience, with an emphasis on problem-based learning.

Additional course and registration information is available at http://www.usip.org/education-training/courses/human-rights-and-international-humanitarian-law

nationalsecuritylaw Upcoming event: Cybersecurity at Roger Williams June 17-20

Upcoming event at Roger Williams (Newport, RI):

Cyber Threats and Cyber Realities: Law, Policy, and Regulation in Business, the Professions and National Security

From June 17-20, Roger Williams University will host an Institute in beautiful Bristol, Rhode Island on the legal and policy landscape of cyber risks, foreign and domestic. Cybersecurity has recently taken center stage for government, business, and the professions. Former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta warned last fall about the prospect of a “cyber Pearl Harbor.” A cyber security firm recently traced back to a Chinese government agency a wave of cyber intrusions that harvested information about U.S. critical infrastructure. Cyber crime has also proliferated, through burgeoning efforts to steal trade secrets, undermine privacy and confidentiality in health care and legal data, and defraud unknowing consumers through trafficking in misappropriate passwords. While cyber is increasingly important, only a few experts and practitioners have a working knowledge of how cyber interacts with law, policy, and regulation. Cyber Threats and Cyber Realities fills that gap.

Cyber Threats and Cyber Realities, jointly sponsored by the Roger Williams University School of Law and School of Justice Studies, will be an interactive forum with nationally known experts and practitioners on cyber law, policy, and regulation. Organized in two two-day modules, attendees will learn about domestic law and policy on June 17-18, and international law and national security on June 19-20. In addition to informative panels, each module will include as a capstone experience a simulation that offers participants an opportunity to collaborate in resolving a regulatory challenge or national security crisis.

Attendance in the event is open to lawyers, law enforcement personnel, health-care administrators, corporate employees, legal and other academics, and J.D. and other graduate and undergraduate students. A CLE application (including all-important Ethics credit) is pending. Roger Williams J.D. students can get one academic credit for each module, or two credits for completing both (including an exam). School of Justice Studies students may use participation in the conference as part of a for-credit directed research project. J.D. and other students from other institutions should consult with their schools regarding credit eligibility. Students who get at least one credit will also receive a certificate showing their completion of a course of study in cybersecurity.

Costs: For lawyers, other professionals, and students not seeking academic credit: $150/day, $275/two-day module, $475 for all four days. J.D. and other RWU students will pay standard tuition per credit; students at other schools should consult their own institution.

For more information, contact Events Office at lawevents@rwu.edu or call (401)254-4659.

Preliminary schedule:

I. DOMESTIC LAW, POLICY, AND REGULATION

Monday

9:00 a.m.: Cyber Risks in the Domestic and International Realms

Dr. John Savage, Brown University

Timothy Edgar, Fellow, Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University (formerly Director of Privacy and Civil Liberties, White House National Security Staff)

10:30 a.m.: Cyber and Privacy Threats

Linn Foster Freedman, Nixon Peabody

Theresa Murray, former Director, Rhode Island Emergency Management Association

Dr. Doug White, Roger Williams University School of Criminal Justice

1:00 p.m.: Intellectual Property and Torts:

Prof. Zoe Argento, Roger Williams University School of Law

Prof. Michael Rustad, Suffolk University School of Law (invited)

3:00 p.m.: Legal Ethics and Preventing Cyber Threats to Client Secrets

Prof. Peter Margulies, Roger Williams University School of Law

Linn Foster Freedman, Nixon Peabody

Tuesday:

9:00 a.m.: Domestic Regulation of Cyber Security: The Legislative Outlook and Policy Landscape

Paul Rosenzweig, Esq. (formerly Dep’t of Homeland Security)

Allan Friedman, Brookings Institution

Jonathan Schneider, Stinson Morrison Hecker LLP

Prof. Nathan Sales, George Mason University School of Law

10:30 a.m.: Cyber Crime: Constitutional Limits and the Reach of Federal Law

Prof. Mary-Rose Papandrea, Boston College School of Law (invited)

Prof. Victor Hansen, New England Law School

1:00 p.m.: Simulation: Threading the Needle: Passing a Federal Cyber Regulation Statute

4:00 p.m.: Conclusion

II. CYBER IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT

Wednesday, June 19,

9:00 a.m.: The Global Threat Environment:

Col. James G. Bitzes, USAF, Cyber Com Staff Judge Advocate (invited)

Col. Gary Brown, USAF (Ret.), Deputy Legal Director, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Regional Delegation for the U.S. and Canada

10:30 a.m.: The Organizational Structure of Responses to Cyber Threats:

Paul Rosenzweig, Esq. (formerly Dep’t of Homeland Security)

Allan Friedman, Brookings Institution

Prof. Nathan Sales, George Mason University School of Law

1:00 p.m.: The Use of Force in the Cyber Context

Prof. Michael N. Schmitt, Chair, International Law Department, U.S. Naval War College

Prof. Laurie Blank, Emory University School of Law (invited)

3:00 p.m. The Conduct of War and Cyber Operations

Gary Brown, ICRC

Prof. Michael N. Schmitt, Naval War College

Thursday:

9:00 a.m.: Cyber Attacks and International Human Rights:

Glenn Sulmasy, Chair, Humanities Department, U.S. Coast Guard Academy

Dr. Michael C. Fowler, Adjunct Professor, Roger Williams University (invited)

10:30: Legal Ethics and Cyber Defense:

Maj. Gen. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr. USAF (Ret.), Director, Center for Law, Ethics, and National Security, Duke University School of Law (invited)

Prof. Peter Margulies, Roger Williams

1:00 p.m.: Simulation: A Cyber Pearl Harbor: Threats and Responses

4:00 Conference Conclusion

nationalsecuritylaw forthcoming scholarship

Meaningful Membership: Making War a Bit More Criminal

Rachel Elizabeth VanLandingham

Stetson University College of Law

Cardozo Law Review (forthcoming)

Should membership in a particular group, by itself, be enough for the government to kill you? This Article starts with the classic lawyer answer of “it depends” but goes beyond it to answer yes, explain why, and recommend limits. The heart of the matter is found in how the law of armed conflict treats transnational, non-state armed groups such as al-Qaeda. When such groups are viewed analogously to state militaries, their members are lawfully subject to lethal attack based on their membership status, distinct from actual hostile conduct. By comparing this focus on status to federal criminal law’s treatment of membership, this Article exposes the current targeting paradigm’s dangerous lack of membership criteria. This legal insufficiency exposes the United States to legitimate charges of arbitrary killing.

Yet far from calling for the demise of membership-based targeting in warfare, this article defends the practice while outlining a vital need for clear legal limits. Its primary contribution is its suggestion that guidelines should be drawn from criminal law’s more developed treatment of membership and associational ties as grounds for government action. Specifically, it proposes formally incorporating 18 U.S.C. § 2339B’s conduct plus coordination model, used to prosecute material support to terrorist organizations, into the wartime membership assessment process. This Article reveals that while the wartime methodology roughly approximates the federal statute’s approach, it is legally insufficient due to its ad hoc nature, unbounded scope and lack of rigor. To fix these deficiencies in wartime identification, this Article’s normative analysis highlights both the utility of adopting the statutory model’s categorical method, and the criticality of adding a tailored scienter requirement. Without such limitations, enemy group membership is legally meaningless, and its service as grounds to kill questionable at best.

The Social Production of National Security

Aziz Huq

Cornell Law Review, Vol. 98, 2013

This Article analyzes a recent policy innovation offered by governments on both sides of the Atlantic as a means of mitigating one form of national security risk: the idea that private individuals and voluntary associations have an untapped capacity for combating terrorism and in particular al Qaeda. Bold assertions in recent strategy statements mooting this possibility have wanted for any supporting account of how private behavior conduces to security. Even if the claimed social production of security against terrorism is causally well founded, it is unclear how the state can elicit desirable private conduct. Consequently, the proposal’s legal and policy ramifications remain elusive. To begin to address these gaps, this Article develops a comprehensive analysis of three plausible causal mechanisms that might yield the putative security-related benefits of social action. I label these ideological competition, ethical anchoring and cooperative coproduction. Drawing on legal, economic, and social psychology scholarship to illuminate these three mechanisms, this Article further investigates the state’s role in eliciting potentially desirable private action against terrorism risk. The Article concludes by highlighting threshold legal, strategic, and ethical puzzles in designing policies to elicit counterterrorism’s social production — puzzles that to date have received short shrift in American counterterrorism debates.

The Geography of Cyber Conflict: Through a Glass Darkly

Ashley Deeks

University of Virginia – School of Law
International Law Studies, Vol. 89, p. 1, 2013

The unbounded geography of cyber-conflict poses particular challenges to state sovereignty. Like certain other states, the United States has asserted that it is lawful to use force in self-defense against non-state actors in countries that either give the United States consent to do so or are “unwilling or unable” to suppress the threat themselves. This article explores how the “unwilling or unable” limitation should apply when a state seeks to respond to a cyber attack. Although the limitation remains relevant when a victim state suffers a cyber armed attack that is launched from the territory of a non-hostile state, the test’s application is complicated by problems of attribution, proliferation, and secrecy about cyber-capacities. Yet the “unwilling or unable” inquiry stands between the victim state and geographically-unbounded cyber-war, and must be taken seriously.

Consent to the Use of Force and International Law Supremacy

Ashley Deeks

University of Virginia – School of Law
Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 54, No. 1, 2013

Many celebrate international law as a way to compel states to protect human rights. Often it serves this role. But sometimes it has the reverse effect: states use international agreements to circumvent individual rights in domestic law. For example, the United States reportedly relied on Italy’s consent to render a terrorist suspect from the streets of Milan into secret detention. Pakistan seems to have authorized U.S. lethal strikes against Al Qaeda members without regard to rights protections in Pakistani law.

This Article uses the under-examined phenomenon of international consent to the use of force to explore the larger question of how states use international law to circumvent individual rights. International law facilitates these rights violations by embracing a principle termed “supremacy.” Supremacy requires a state to prioritize its international obligations over its domestic laws. This means that a state may rely on another state’s consent to an agreement without asking whether that consent violates the rights of individuals in the consenting state.

To minimize this manipulation of international law, the Article proposes that states receiving consent to use force bear a “duty to inquire” to ensure that the state consenting to the use of force is acting in a manner consistent with its domestic laws. This solution challenges international law’s traditional approach to supremacy. The Article shows why a more functional approach to supremacy for international agreements that operate at the intersection of national security and individual rights will advance the goals of international and domestic law more effectively.

nationalsecuritylaw forthcoming scholarship

The Individualization of War: From Collectivism to Individualism in the Regulation of Armed Conflicts

Gabriella Blum (Harvard Law School)
Law and War, Sarat, Douglas, Umphrey eds., Stanford University Press, 2013

In a celebrated humanitarian move, wartime regulation has evolved from a predominantly state-oriented set of obligations — which viewed war as an inter-collective effort — to a more individual-focused regime. In fact, the regulation of armed conflict increasingly resembles, at least in aspiration, the regulation of police activities, in which it is the welfare of individuals, rather than the collective interest of the state, that takes center stage.

I demonstrate that many contemporary debates over the laws of war, including the distinction between the jus ad bellum and jus in bello, proportionality, detention of combatants, and reparations for victims implicate exactly the tension between collectivism and individualism in the regulation of armed conflict.

I further argue that notwithstanding the humanitarian benefits of the move to greater concern over the human rights of those affected by war, reimagining war as a policing operation harbors real dangers that must not be overlooked. These include imagining more of policing as war, inhibiting military action for the protection of others, and inviting more aggressive acts “short of war” against targets around the world.

Assassination or Targeted Killings after 9/11

John Yoo

University of California at Berkeley School of Law
New York Law School Law Review, Vol. 56, 2012

Critics argue that the use of drones to target alleged members of al Qaeda and related groups violate international and domestic law, particularly the treaty prohibition on extra-judicial killings and the U.S. ban on assassination. These criticisms rest on profound misconceptions of the nature of the war on terrorism and the rules of warfare. Because the United States is at war with al-Qaeda, it can use force — especially targeted force — to conduct hostilities against the enemy’s leaders. This does not violate any American law — constitutional, congressional, or presidential — or any ratified treaty. Precise attacks against individuals have long been a feature of warfare. These attacks further the goals of the laws of war by eliminating the enemy and reducing harm to innocent civilians. Legality aside, targeted killing or assassination can be the best policy in certain circumstances. In the new type of war thrust upon the United States by the 9/11 attacks, the enemy resembles a network, not a nation. This essay argues that targeted killing is a prime tactic for the United States because of al-Qaeda’s unique characteristics as a decentralized, free-scale terrorist network. Despite al-Qaeda’s lawlessness, the United States must still abide by the limits imposed by necessity, discrimination, and proportionality, as well as standard principles of reciprocity, in its use of force against al-Qaeda.

Policing Terrorists in the Community

Sahar F. Aziz

Texas Wesleyan University School of Law
Harvard National Security Journal, Fall 2013

Twelve years after the September 11th attacks, countering domestic terrorism remains a top priority for federal law enforcement agencies. Using a variety of reactive and preventive tactics, law enforcement seeks to prevent terrorism before it occurs. Towards that end, community policing developed in the 1990s to combat violent crime in inner city communities is being adopted as a means of collaborating with Muslim communities and local police to combat ‘Islamist homegrown terrorism.’ Developed in response to paramilitary policing models, community policing is built upon the notion that effective policing requires mutual trust and relationships among local law enforcement and the communities they serve. Thus, traditional community policing is premised on their convergence of interests.

While community policing in counterterrorism appears facially sound, this Article proffers that this endeavor is fraught with peril – both for collective civil liberties interests and local police’s interests in preserving relationships of trust. Accordingly, community policing exacerbates, rather than resolves, the underlying subordination of Muslims post-9/11 manifested in preventive counterterrorism policies, notwithstanding the increase of homegrown terrorism threats from non-Muslim groups.

The Article asserts three critiques of community policing in counterterrorism: it is more akin to counterradicalization taken from military counterinsurgency strategy than the partnership-based traditional community policing model; to the collective detriment of communities it divides them into ‘Good Muslims’ willing to cooperate with law enforcement on the federal government’s terms and ‘Bad Muslims’ who demand a meaningful quid quo pro that ensures protection of Muslim communities’ civil rights and liberties; and it deputizes Muslim leaders to gather and share seemingly innocuous information about their communities that may be used adversely to their collective interests as part of the predominantly prosecution-driven counterterrorism regime.

As such, CCP as currently envisioned betrays its rhetoric of empowerment and mutual trust, and is just another weapon in the federal government’s toolkit that perpetuates the ‘terrorist other’ stereotype. Unless systemic reforms are made to federal preventive counterterrorism strategies, community policing is likely to aggravate existing civil liberties violations and impair otherwise good relations between Muslim communities and local police. Thus, a serious rethinking of proposals to implement community policing in counterterrorism is warranted.

The Future of the Law of Armed Conflict: Ostriches, Butterflies, and Nanobots

Eric Talbot Jensen

Brigham Young University School of Law
Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 35, No. 2, 2014, Forthcoming

The law has consistently lagged behind technological developments. This is particularly true in armed conflict, where the 1907 Hague Conventions and the 1949 Geneva Conventions form the basis for regulating emerging technologies in the 21st century. However, the law of armed conflict, or LOAC, serves an important signaling function to states about the development of new weapons. As advancing technology opens the possibility of not only new developments in weapons, but also new genres of weapons, nations will look to the LOAC for guidance on how to manage these new technological advances.

Because many of these technologies are in the very early stages of development or conception, the international community is at a point in time where we can see into the future of armed conflict and discern some obvious points where future technologies and developments are going to stress the current LOAC. While the current LOAC will be sufficient to regulate the majority of future conflicts, we must respond to these discernible issues by anticipating how to evolve the LOAC in an effort to bring these future weapons under control of the law, rather than have them used with devastating effect before the lagging law can react.

This paper analyzes potential future advances in weapons and tactics and highlights the LOAC principles that will struggle to apply as currently understood. The paper will then suggest potential evolutions of the LOAC to ensure it continuing efficacy in future armed conflicts.

"Self-Defence, Intervention by Invitaion, or Proxy War? The Legality of the 2006 Ethiopian Invasion of Somalia"

AHMED ALI M KHAYRE, University of London, Birkbeck College- School of Law

In late 2006, heavily armed Ethiopian troops invaded Somalia with tacit support of the United States. Subsequently, Ethiopia used two legal justifications for its military intervention, namely, inherent right of self-defense and an invitation from the transitional government of Somalia. If nothing else, it appears Ethiopia and the United States wanted to seek a casus belli for military intervention against Union of Islamic Courts. This article examines whether the Ethiopian intervention can be justified as an exception to the general prohibition of the use of force embodied in the United Nations Charter.

Legitimate Target: A Criteria-Based Approach to Targeted Killing

Amos Guiora

Oxford University Press

Add to Cart

ISBN13: 9780199969739ISBN10: 0199969736Hardcover, 122 pages

$85.00 (07)

Targeted killings represent both the contemporary weapon of choice and, clearly, the weapon of the future. From the perspective of the nation-state, the benefits of targeted killing are clear: aggressive measures against identified targets can be carried out with minimal, if any, risk to soldiers. But while the threat to soldiers is minimal, there are other risks that must be considered. Particularly, there is a high possibility of collateral damage as well as legitimate concerns regarding how a target is defined. Clearly broad legal, moral, and operational issues are at stake when considering targeted killing.

In Legitimate Target, A Criteria Based Approach to Targeted Killing, Amos Guiora proposes that targeted killing decisions must reflect consideration of four distinct elements: law, policy, morality, and operational details, thus ensuring that it complies with principles of domestic and international laws. The author, writing from both personal experience and an academic perspective, offers important criticism and insight into the policy as presently implemented, highlighting the need for a criteria based decision making process in defining and identifying a legitimate target. Legitimate Target, A Criteria-Based Approach to Targeted Killing blends concrete examples with a nuanced study of the current targeted killing paradigm with an emphasis on the dilemmas of morality and the law.

Prisoners of Congress: The Constitutional and Political Clash Over Detainees and the Closure of Guantanamo

David Jason Rankin Frakt

University of Pittsburgh – School of Law; US Air Force JAG Corps Reserve

74 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 1 (2012)

This article discusses the series of increasingly stringent legislative restrictions placed on the transfer or release of Guantanamo detainees from 2009 to the present, the politics behind the restrictions, the effect of such restrictions individually and cumulatively on the detainees, and the constitutionality of such restrictions. The article concludes that dozens of innocent, low-risk and cleared detainees have had their releases or transfers delayed or blocked completely by Congressional spending restrictions. The article refers to these detainees as "Prisoners of Congress." The article also analyzes the extent to which Congress, as compared to the President, can be held responsible for the failure of President Obama’s declared intention to close the detention facilities at Guantanamo.

nationalsecuritylaw 21st Annual National Security Law Institute (UVA, June 2-14)

Training opportunity: The 21st Annual National Security Law Institute (UVA, June 2-14)

Every year I try to draw particular attention to this terrific event, and for good reason: it is a wonderful occasion to take a deep dive into an array of topics that will interest any member of the listserv, in the company of an invariably-fascinating group of fellow participants from all sorts of professional and national backgrounds. Please note that this is not just for law professors: government officials, professors from other disciplines, all sorts of other profiles are typically there as well. More information appears below (full disclosure: I am one of the folks who lectures as part of this institute):

Center for National Security Law

University of Virginia School of Law

Charlottesville, VA 22903

SPACES STILL AVAILABLE FOR

21ST NATIONAL SECURITY LAW INSTITUTE

(June 2-14, 2013)

The Center for National Security Law at the University of Virginia School of Law announces that there are still spaces available for the 21st National Security Law Institute, a highly regarded, two-week training program that will be held at the Law School in Charlottesville from Sunday, June 2, until Friday, June 14. The Institute is open to professors of law and related disciplines, as well as to government attorneys with national security law responsibilities. Professors and attorneys from foreign nations on six continents have taken part in the Institute since it was founded in 1991.

A distinguished group of national security professionals will again provide instruction during the program, including:

Ø Former Director of Central Intelligence, the Honorable R. James Woolsey;

Ø Former National Security Council Legal Adviser and currently Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Services, the Honorable James E. Baker;

Ø Former National Security Agency General Counsel and Assistant Secretary for Homeland Security Policy, the Honorable Stewart Baker;

Ø Former Deputy Judge Advocate General of the Air Force and currently Director of the Center on Law, Ethics, and National Security at Duke University School of Law, Major General Charles Dunlap;

Ø The Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Brigadier General Richard C. Gross;

Ø The founder of the academic discipline of National Security Law, who has been teaching the subject since 1969, Professor John Norton Moore;

Ø Former Acting General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency, John Rizzo;

Ø The Charles I. Francis Professor in Law at the University of Texas School of Law, Robert M. Chesney;

Ø Georgetown Law Center Professor Laura Donohue, of the Center for National Security and Law;

Ø Many other leading authorities from the academic community, and/or with backgrounds in the Pentagon, the FBI, the Army Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, the Naval War College, and elsewhere.

This summer’s Institute will include an enhanced emphasis on cyber issues, along with the more traditional coverage of war and peace theory, the constitutional separation of national security powers, intelligence community law, domestic and international terrorism, international organized crime, the law of war (jus ad bellum and jus in bello), war crimes, piracy, treaty powers, and many other subjects.

For further information about the Institute, visit the Institute’s web page at:

http://www.virginia.edu/cnsl/nsli.html

or contact the Center at:

Center for National Security Law

University of Virginia School of Law

580 Massie Road

Charlottesville, VA 22903-1738

email: cnsl

(434) 924-4083

fax: (434) 924-7362

________

“The University of Virginia’s Center for National Security Law stands as one of the Nation’s premier institutes of its kind, not just because of its exceptional academic excellence, but also because of the unique way it connects practitioners, academics, and scholars from other disciplines, particularly through its National Security Law Institute. It has made a huge difference in my career, and I know the same can be said of several generations of national security law devotees of every kind. It is a very special national asset that has made enormous contributions to the field, and it well deserves the highest accolades on its accomplishments.”

— Maj. Gen. Charles Dunlap, Jr. (USAF Ret.)

Director, Center for Law, Ethics, and National Security

Duke University School of Law; former Deputy Judge Advocate General, U.S. Air Force; graduate and frequent lecturer, National Security Law Institute (shown above lecturing to the 17th Institute).