My apologies that my attempt to correct the date on the last email (about the charges against KSM) presented a formatting issue for the listserv system. I merely changed the date from “Mar. 31” to “May 31”.
=?ISO-8859-1?Q?=20?=(Mil. Com. May 31, 2011)
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DOD Announces Charges Sworn Against Five Detaine= es Allegedly Responsible for 9/11 Attacks
* United States v. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, et al. (Mil. Com. Mar. 31, 2011)
|From DOD’s press release:|
nationalsecuritylaw al-Kidd v. Ashcroft (S.Ct. Mar. 31, 2011) (reversing 9th Circuit on material witness statute and immunity)May 31, 2011
* al-Kidd v. Ashcroft (S.Ct. Mar. 31, 2011) (reversing 9th Circuit on material witness statute and immunity)
The Supreme Court has reversed the Ninth Circuit in al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, a Bivens action in which the plaintiff alleges (among other things) that then-Attorney General John Ashcroft violated the Fourth Amendment by directing prosecutors to use the material witness detention statute pretextually in order to incarcerate terrorism-related suspects. I’ve posted details and commentary here.
nationalsecuritylaw United States v. Hammadi (W.D. Kentucky Mar. 31, 2011) (arrests involving insurgency in Iraq)May 31, 2011
* United States v. Hammadi (W.D. Kentucky Mar. 31, 2011) (arrests involving insurgency in Iraq)
The DOJ press release providing the details is here; the indictment of Mohanad Shareef Hammadi and Waad Ramadan Alwan is here; the complaint and accompanying affidavit againt Hammadi is here; and the complaint and affidavit against Alwan is here. As you will see, the cases involve extensive allegations of activity not just while in Iraq but also later after arrival in the United States (both men entered the United States in 2009, applying for and receiving refugee status).
* Forthcoming Scholarship (reminder – click on title to go to article)
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, Vol. 33, 2011
Samuel T. Morison (DOD, Office of Military Commissions-Appellate Defense)
At present, there are two military commission cases involving terrorism defendants incarcerated at Guantánamo Bay making their way through the appellate courts. In both cases, the defendants are challenging their convictions for “providing material support for terrorism.” While this is a federal offense that could be prosecuted in an Article III court, the legal issue in these appeals is whether providing material support is also a war crime subject to the jurisdiction of a military tribunal. Congress incorporated the offense into the Military Commissions Act, but that is not dispositive, since it is arguably beyond Congress’ legislative competence to create war crimes out of whole cloth and then impose them on foreign nationals having no jurisdictional nexus to the United States.
As a result, the Government has not disputed that there must be at least some historical evidence that the conduct now styled “providing material support” to an enemy previously has been treated as a war crime, where the defendant was a non-resident alien who owed no duty of allegiance to the injured State. In what might be fairly described as a desperate attempt to discharge its burden of persuasion, the Government has now embraced the only “precedent” that comes close to fitting this description. This is problematic, however, because it is also one of the most notorious episodes in the history of American military justice.
In 1818, then Major General Andrew Jackson led an armed invasion of Spanish Florida, thereby instigating the First Seminole War. In the course of the conflict, his troops captured two British citizens who had been living in Florida among the Seminole Indians. In his inimitable style, Jackson impetuously ordered the summary trial and execution of these men, allegedly for “inciting” the Seminoles to engage in “savage warfare” against the United States. Worse yet, Jackson’s immediate motivation for the invasion was to recapture fugitive slaves, who had escaped from the adjacent States and found refuge among the Seminoles. In addition to territorial expansion, his mission was to return this “property” to their “rightful” owners and prevent Florida from serving as a safe haven for runaway slaves.
Remarkably, the legal basis of the Government’s assertion of military jurisdiction over material support charges therefore rests on Jackson’s decision to execute two men, who were almost certainly innocent, in the context of a war of aggression waged to vindicate the property rights of antebellum Southern slaveholders. The purpose of this essay is to reintroduce the episode to a wider audience, and to reflect on the implications of the Government’s decision to rely on it as a precedent for a modern war crimes prosecution.
SASCHA-DOMINIK OLIVER VLADIMIR BACHMANN, University of Portsmouth – School of Law
This article aims to assess the impact that the European Convention of Human Rights, incorporated into British law through the Human Rights Act 1998, has had on the control order regime in the United Kingdom. It will discuss recent British jurisprudence on the topical question whether there can be a true balance between the civil liberties of an individual and the need to protect state and society from a continuing terrorist threat. The article compares the UK’s present control order system of summer 2010 with similar legislation, which the Commonwealth jurisdictions of Australia and Canada enacted to protect their nations from the threat of terrorism. It will conclude with a discussion of possible reforms as well as other security measures that have been identified as alternatives to control orders and which form the basis of present UK governmental initiatives to limit scope and impact of Anti Terrorism Legislation.