2. U. Richmond Law Review symposium: Detaining Suspected Terrorists: Past, Present and Future” (April 2, 2009)
In March 2009, the Richmond Law Review will publish its Allen Chair Symposium Issue (Vol. 43, No. 3). The topic for this year’s symposium is “Detaining Suspected Terrorists: Legal Challenges of the Past, Present, and Future.” To order a copy of the March 2009 issue, please fill out the Subscription Form.
In conjunction with the publication of the 2009 Allen Chair issue, the University of Richmond Law Review will host its Allen Chair Symposium on April 2, 2009. The symposium will consist of separate panels addressing various aspects of detainee rights and reflections on the future of American law and policy. The symposium will be held at the Jepson Alumni Center at the University of Richmond, and is free of charge.
The symposium will run from 4-7 p.m., with a reception to follow. Participants include: Professor Nathan Sales (George Mason University School of Law), Professor Stephen Vladeck (American University Washington College of Law), Professor Benjamin Priester (Florida Coastal University School of Law), Professor Kyndra Rotunda (Chapman University School of Law), Professor Kristine Huskey (University of Texas School of Law), Professor Gregory McNeal (Penn State University Dickinson School of Law), and Tung Yin (University of Iowa College of Law).
3. Forthcoming Scholarship
“The Central Intelligence Agency’s ‘Family Jewels’: Legal Then? Legal Now?”
Indiana Law Journal, Vol. 84, p. 637, 2009
DANIEL L. PINES, Central Intelligence Agency
Email: thedanielpines@yahoo.com
Congress and the media recently have claimed that various activities of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) – from rendition operations, to the destruction of videotapes, to the maintenance of secret detention facilities overseas – are illegal. Critics levied similar charges against the CIA thirty-five years ago, with regard to activities contained in the “Family Jewels” – the 1973 compilation of the CIA’s darkest secrets. The recent release of the Family Jewels provides the opportunity to try to put today’s concerns in perspective. This Article evaluates the key activities conducted by the CIA as described in the Family Jewels – experimentation on unconsenting individuals, attempted targeted killings of foreign leaders, electronic surveillance of Americans, examination of U.S. mail, and collection of information on American dissident movements. Contrary to widely held beliefs both then and now, all but one of these activities (experimentation on unconsenting individuals) were legal when they were committed, suggesting that other allegedly “illegal” activities, engaged in by the CIA now, may similarly prove to be lawful.
“The War Powers Resolution, Once Again”
American Journal of International Law, January 2009
MICHAEL J. GLENNON, Tufts University – The Fletcher School
Email: michael.glennon@tufts.edu
On July 8, 2008, the “National War Powers Commission” issued a report recommending repeal of the 1973 War Powers Resolution and enactment of a new law. The new law would put in place a consultation requirement applicable to significant armed conflicts, set up a new joint congressional committee for the President to consult, and establish a procedure aimed at requiring congressional approval or disapproval of such conflicts. The members of the Miller Center panel are owed a debt of gratitude for helping to focus public attention on these problems and adding to the impetus for reform. The panel’s proposals, however, present an illusory solution to a non-problem. The problem is not, as its report suggests, that Congress sometimes is silent in the wake of significant but unauthorized use of force by the President. The problem, rather, is that force sometimes is used by the President without congressional or constitutional authority. The solution to this problem is not, as its proposal recommends, to try to force Congress to approve or disapprove that use of force after the fact, or to force the President merely to consult with a few members of Congress beforehand. Congress has no obligation to say anything when faced with a presidential fait accompli that violates the Constitution; it often would be good if it did, but that is, at least partially, the job of the courts. Seeking a few congressional opinions does not fulfill the constitutional requirement of prior legislative authorization. The report is correct that Congress needs to address the Resolution’s flaws. The real question is whether Congress truly wants to force its inclusion in the decision to go to war. If it does, the constitutional means are available to do that.
Robert Chesney's National Security Law Listserv Archive 